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This article discusses discursive transformations in the performance of the government
and the “hashtag landscape,” studying Twitter discussions and the female-led government
of one of the youngest Prime Ministers in the world, Sanna Marin of Finland. Among the
countries in Europe, Finland has been, in the period of analysis of March 2020 to January
2021, one of the least affected countries by the COVID-19 pandemic. Our datasets from
both Twitter discussions and the government’s press conferences in 2020 reveal which
were the emerging topics of the pandemic year in Finland and how they were discussed.
We observe a move from consensual governmental political control to control in the hands
of the authorities and ministers responsible, performing a different basis for the pandemic.
On the “hashtag landscape,” facemasks continually emerge as an object of debate, and
they also become a point of trust and distrust that the government cannot ignore. In terms
of comparative governance, this article also notes how the emergency powers legislation
shifted control to the government from regional authorities and municipalities in spring
2020, and by that autumn, those powers were returned to regional and local bodies. We
recognize several themes that were contested and the discursive field’s transformations
and interplay with the authorities.
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INTRODUCTION
This article investigates the performance of control in press conferences and in Twitter
discussions related to COVID-19, in a country that survived the pandemic well in 2020.
The female-led government of the young social democratic Prime Minister Sanna Marin
was faced with a historic challenge merely months after its appointment in 2019 (Palonen
2020) but also online harassment (Van Sant et al., 2021). Control in pandemic politics is a
paradox. It is impossible to be in control of a border-crossing, air-transmitting virus. Similarly, it
is impossible to be in control of politics in a democracy. Political communication and
commentary on Twitter are constitutively performative acts. The government and
authorities appear as if they were in control and convincing the people of their pandemic
measures relying on expert advice and leadership. In their seminal work on government
communication, Sanders and Canel (2013, 331) wrote “window-dressing exercises to give
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the appearance of open government communication,” which
we find crucial when considering the performativity control.
From a post-foundational perspective, we do not take
leadership for granted, but the task of politics is to fill the
ultimately empty space of power (Laclau 2014; see Palonen
2021).
The numbers of COVID-19 cases in Finland in 2020 were
contained: the state of emergency, social distancing, and other
lockdown acts resulted in fewer hospitalized cases caused by other
respiratory infections and shrunk the RSV and influenza seasons
(Kuitunen et al., 2020). To discuss ethical approaches by different
governments, Häyry (2021, 43) identified four main approaches
for dealing with the pandemic. The first, containing and
mitigating the disease, chosen in many countries, would
“flatten the curve,” to enable healthcare systems to be better
prepared to provide effective care. In spring 2020, the virus was
spreading in the Helsinki metropolitan region, and foreign travel
was restricted. In an exceptionally warm year, many from south
Finland had planned to travel north to enjoy the record amounts
of snow or to go to their vacation homes, but the government
decided to use emergency powers legislation to ensure
containment of the virus in the region. It ordered a lockdown
and regional closure of the metropolitan Uusimaa region, with
police and the Finnish Defense Forces in place to restrict
unnecessary border-crossing from 18 March to 14 April,
covering the Easter holiday break (Willberg et al., 2021). In
contrast, in Sweden, and especially those from the capital
Stockholm region, people traveled to the Alps for their winter
holidays: the virus was already rampant in Sweden when the state
epidemiologist opted for the second “herd immunity” approach.
In May, Finland, like Germany and others, adopted the third
approach, “a test, track, isolate, and treat model to manage and
control the pandemic” (Häyry 2021, 46; emphasis original), to
keep down virus reproduction (RE) through measures that
minimize infection rates and identify spread, loosening some,
and imposing other lockdown measures. Sometimes suppression,
the fourth approach, was also mentioned in Finland. Singling out
“control” is important for our argument and research question of
how the government performed pandemic control and how was it
received and contested. Häyry (2021, 43–44) points out that the
government managed to express its recommendations in such a
way that they were interpreted as legislation by citizens. For us,
this points to performative control.
The Nordic expectation of openness also has demanded
transparency of governance, but in practice, the demand for
transparency is meant only superficially (Erkkilä 2012).
Government communication includes ceremonial elements,
and it is disconnected from the policy itself (Vesa 2015). Finns
generally trust their authorities and argue Kääriäinen, Isotalus
and Thomassen (2016). The question of speaking the truth or
lying emerges as pivotal in the Finnish “mask gate” debate of
autumn 2020, when the issue of masks, as it was argued in the
spring by the government, was negated. Considering healthcare
crisis leadership from an ethical communication point of view,
Häyry (2021, 47) argued that the Swedish government, in its
outspoken heard immunity policy, was more truthful than the
Finnish one but that historical circumstances in Sweden allowed
for that better than in Finland and other countries where
legitimacy for the situation was sought differently. The
government and the health authorities articulated or
performed their statehood (Palonen 2018; Vulović, 2020) and
their control of the virus. When discussing March 2020, Moisio
(2020, 600) captures the turn to the nation states and highlights
minuscule resistance in Finland, citizens complying with the
requirements of a newly performed bordered history-aware
state entity.
The existing literature notes the pandemic’s effects on
democracy in Finland. The pandemic brought centrism to
the policy process of network governance in Finland
(Neuvonen 2020). Another approach stressed co-creating
and sharing ideas, including new forms of knowledge
production in the “post-liberal” Finnish case, “with a
readiness to share its sovereignty in decision-making with
experts and activate participation of healthcare workers,
parents, teachers, local authorities, and, finally, children
themselves” (Makarychev and Romatshko (2021, 80, 73).
Indeed, the Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare (THL),
the main body advising the pandemic strategy in Finland,
gathered 116 social media posts prior to the first press
conference on 27 February, “to analyze risk perceptions and
trust towards public authorities in the context of coronavirus
disease,” recognized five central types of risk perceptions, and
proposed answers to them: catastrophic potential, probability
of death, reasons of exposure, belief of controllability, and trust
in authorities (Lohiniva et al., 2020). This legitimized our
research design: the communicating authorities that we
studied also followed Twitter discussions.
Twitter enabled the Finnish close-knit virtual elites to perform
their “politics of presence,” Ruoho and Kuusipalo (2019, 81)
argue that “the myth of the mediated center seems to persuade
politicians and journalists from all levels of society to join a
special kind of Twitter network dominated by the “inner circle” of
top-level political and media elites.” The interplay between the
elected officials and the expert organizations and authorities is
also visible in our data. We study the authorities and the debating
“hashtag publics” (Rambukkana 2015), the co-occurrence and
ministerial presence of government press conferences, and social
media discussions, through interpretative analysis of the themes
of communication and contestation. Existing research explores
forms of government criticism or interaction on COVID-19 on
Twitter (between two approaches in Finland: Väliverronen et al.,
2020; overall topic modelling analysis of Spring 2020; Agarwal
et al., 2020 and Doogan et al., 2020). Existing research has also
demonstrated that female politicians, including the Finnish
Prime Minister, face harassment online, as NATO Strategic
Communications Centre for Excellence’s study unveils (Van
Sant et al., 2021). Our data, as well, unveil critical points to
assess also of gender and misogyny as constitutive antagonism in
Twitter discussions.
We agree with Lindgren (2020) that data science requires some
anarchism and that open-ended discourse theory fits with
cracking large datasets. We were forced to be creative,
mapping the pandemic’s transformation through a
longitudinal analysis. Our period of investigation, 11 January
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2020 to 11 January 2021, stretches from before the virus officially
arrived in Finland to the first sets of vaccinations.
Recognizing the constitutive power of rhetoric in articulation
(Laclau 2014), we merged two types of performative data.
Government by appearing in press conferences takes the space
of representation becoming the faces of control and the social
media response performs citizenship, sometimes critical of the
authorities, contesting their role and policies as the non-
homogeneous hashtag public. Developing on Laclau and
Mouffe’s (1985) Essex School of post-structuralist discourse
theory, for us meanings are relational and transform the
discursive field, where structures of meaning are contingent and
antagonist rather than smooth. Research offers snapshots of this
transforming discursive field, which is difficult to capture. Our
interpretive, non-essentialist, post-foundational approach focuses
on relationality, drawing on large social media datasets. Therefore,
our methodological key research question is as follows: how can we
study the contingent structures of the uneven, contested discursive
field and see how control is performed and contested through
interventions during the pandemic?
Our methodological solution was to combine topic
instrumentalism with rhetoric-performative interpretive
analysis (Palonen 2019; Pääkkönen and Ylikoski 2020). More
sophisticated analytical tools have been called for Laclaudian
discourse theory (Marttila 2019), and we enhance post-
Laclaudian approaches with an interpretive take on LDA topic
modelling also going beyond a search of “nodal points” (Isoaho
et al. 2019), to addressing temporal transformation through
“floating signifiers.” This resulted in a novel way of analyzing
two diverse types of data, present in our rich section on analysis
and in the multiple annexes, which we present in depth. We hope
it adds to other strategies of studying hegemony discursively
through topic modelling (Jacobs and Tschötschel 2019).
Borrowing from both Rambukkana’s “hashtag publics” and
from the discursive field of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), we
developed the term “hashtag landscape” for Twitter discussions
as traced by hashtags and keywords. Rambukkana’s notion focuses
on contingent community-building and eventness, which we
consider important in this process. COVID-19 was an event
that became a “social imaginary,” a constant reference point,
while at the same time debate over policy continued. When the
hashtags are universalized and hence stopped being meaningful or
used as a hashtag, the keyword and replacement hashtags offered a
snapshot of the discursive field in the social media. Our term
“hashtag landscape” captures how, just as the discursive field, the
social media landscape is crisscrossed with antagonisms. It allows
us to go beyond observing meanings produced by accounts or
actants (which drawing on Latourian network theory
Rambukkana considers hashtags), still retrievable within the
gathered data. The transformation of the debates can be
investigated on an aggregated and thematic level, beyond
studying key individuals, politicians, or agencies in detail.
Hashtag landscape would capture shifts, ruptures, and social
imaginaries on the discursive field.
Controlling the pandemic caused by COVID-19 has little to do
directly with the performance of control through the presence
and absence of ministers or Twitter discussions. However, from
our perspective, uncovering the interaction between shifts in
being the faces of authority or embodying the place of power
in press conferences, on the one hand, and debating this in the
public forum, on the other hand, are significant in exploring
contemporary mediated governance. Uncovering shifts in policy
themes and debates, ministerial relationships, and who appears to
be in control gives input to research network governance.
Mapping debates and criticism in contemporary debates on
Twitter highlights the rhetorical and performative side of
politics (Laclau 2014; Moffitt 2016). Our further research
contribution highlights the online presence of politicians and
administrators and their political communication in hybrid
media environments. Our reading of the authorities’ political
communication and public social media discussion enhances the
study of not only the pandemic in Finland but also contemporary
politics that relies on constitutive public performativity (Palonen
2021).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Three different Twitter datasets with an analysis of the Finnish
government’s videoed press conferences serve as samples of
contemporary public discussions (Twitter) and government
communication (press conferences). We interpret them
through discourse analysis and making use of machine
learning. Topic modelling is a useful tool for interpretive
analysis: the first layer of interpretation is done by the
machine, which then proposes sets of related terms in the data
to the researcher to analyze and interpret further. Following
discourse theory, these data samples enable discursive
structures to be found (Lindgren 2020). Our data-driven
research relies on readings of both sets of materials
qualitatively and is assisted by machine-learning, but the
existing literature already presents a central problematization:
the role of the government in COVID-19 communication. The
analysis reveals the key points for each period and follows their
transformation through press conferences and peaking topics’
tweets.
The government’s pandemic communication concentrated on
regular press conferences that aimed to address citizens’ concerns
and communicate government actions and later health
information on the pandemic. They were widely followed via
both the online service of national broadcaster YLE and YouTube,
and the pandemic increased TV watching by 21 percent in
MarchApril 2020. News and related program watching on TV
doubled with the government’s press conferences on 25 March
and 4 May, and the news on 12, 16, and 30 March and 4 April
were among the 20 most popular programs in 2020 (Finnpanel
TABLE 1 | Description of data: periods and tweets.
Period Number of tweets
11 January–22 March 2020 32,233
21 March–26 May 2020 87,272
1 August 2020–10 January 2021 157,630
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2021). For our analysis, we followed who was present, what was
talked about, and the visual illustrations that highlighted the
mood and transformation of events, including the use of
facemasks from only 8 October. Full-scale visual analysis falls
out of the scope of our study. Our data reveal that Twitter
discussion topics often peaked synchronously with the
government’s press conferences. In the timeframe of our
analysis (Table 1), the first period saw the transformation of
COVID-19 as a Finnish issue in the government’s daily press
conferences from 16 March 2020. The second period covers the
first wave of COVID-19 in Finland, as pandemic restrictions were
underway and control of the situation was established, including
the closure of the Uusimaa region, and confirmed COVID-19
cases declined from over 600 per week to 200 per week. In June,
cases reduced to circa 50 per week. The relaxing of regulations
was an issue in June in press conferences, which we also included
in this analysis, and travel restrictions and the EU package were
discussed in July. Our third period starts at the return to work
from school summer holidays and again at the end of the festive
season in January. This period also witnessed the beginning of
vaccinations and the start of the discussion on their availability.
The first two sets were gathered by web search on Mecodify
with specific hashtags and keywords (see Annex 12). In early
spring 2020, hashtags were used in discussions to signal
addressing the pandemic as an issue, and we chose to focus
on tweets signaling contribution to general discussions and even
generating “hashtag publics” (Bruns and Burgess 2015;
Rathnayake and Suthers 2018). In the second period, hashtag
use was declining (see Annex 13). It signaled the hegemonic
presence of the pandemic in Twitter users’ lives; using the hashtag
would single out a contribution to public debate, but in the all-
pervasive pandemic condition, using a hashtag would not make
sense. The volumes of the first two gathered datasets had fewer
tweets than they would have had with keywords, which we
applied for the third set for the above-mentioned reason
(McKelvey, DiGarzia and Rojas 2014). The urgency of the
pandemic faded as the country survived the first wave and
attention turned to the government’s pandemic choices.
To analyze the large Twitter datasets, we apply computational
topic modelling, a computational method used to identify a pre-
determined number (k-number) of topics or clusters in textual
big data. We use the common topic modelling method Latent
Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) (Blei et al., 2003). LDA topic
modelling arranges words to a predefined number of topics
via the co-occurrence of the words in the data. It assumes that
each data unit, here a tweet, is a mixture of topics, and the
algorithm calculates a probability for each tweet and each topic.
Previous research (Wilkerson and Casas, 2017) of topic modelling
has shown the instability of the results and of reliably validating
the results (e.g., Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). To counter this
instability, we validate the topic modelling results using the actual
tweets. Our approach corresponds to the topic of
instrumentalism, where “modelling is not taken to measure
theoretical constructs but instead to provide information about
word patterns, which can be usefully employed to guide
subsequent interpretation of the primary text materials”
(Pääkkönen and Ylikoski, 2019).
We conducted two topic modelling analyses for each of the
three sets. The first analysis was a “small-k” analysis with an
arbitrary six-topic model, to get an overview of the contents of
each dataset. The second analysis was a detailed “large-k”
analysis, where the number of topics for each set was based
on an estimated optimal number. Next, we established topic
timelines which were calculated by counting tweets per day for
each topic. For the “small-k” overview model, we did the
timelines for all six topics per dataset. For the “large-k”
detailed modelling, we did timelines for the 20 most occurring
topics. We examined the topics of both the “small-k” and “large-
k” analysis of each three datasets and the set of 100 most probable
tweets related to each topic. Based on this, we formed a general
interpretation of each topic/tweet, and then, we selected the
topics/tweets that were related to the performance of control
for closer investigation. More details of the topic modelling can be
found in Annex 11.
From the perspective of post-structuralist or post-foundational
discourse theory, a form of interpretive political science (Bevir 2010),
topic modelling offered us a machine-learning perspective to
transforming for structures of the discursive field. Instead of
discussing Twitter handles here, we operate on an aggregate level,
enabled by our take on the continuously transforming “hashtag
landscape.” Contingency, flows, and contestation are crucial to our
approach: while research on topic modelling typically lists keywords
for the whole period, we also provide a timeline of activity for each
topic and compare the transforming salience (peaks highlighted
here) of a particular topic. Besides discussing first six topics on a
more macro level, in more detailed and qualitative analysis, we go
through a larger set of topics and topic-associated tweets. For us
listing topics is not enough: scratching the surface unveils that each
topic can include several even seemingly contradictory themes to
interpret. Qualitative analysis allows us to investigate individual
tweets at key moments for understanding what the topics are
about. The contents of the topics can be diverse, and, besides
recognizing the intensity of tweeting within topics, discursive
reading of topic modelling also includes analysis of the tweets
across time within the topic (see, e.g., Figure 1). As the timeline
for each of the period, we pursue thematic macro-level analysis with
ministers as key signifiers. This resulted in a lengthy analysis, but for
this experimental study, we thought of writing it out.
RESULTS
Dividing the period into three periods, we were able to see the
particularities of these historical moments and track some
returning debates. We are interested in the contents of those
discussions, their spikes, and their relative strength within the
periods. In the first period, each of the press conferences was
led by PM Marin, starting from 27 February. In the second
period, there were different sets of responsible ministers
involved, but most press conferences were led by
ministers—by elected officials rather than bureaucrats—in
the period from 20 March to 27 May. During summer (June
and July), six of the seven press conferences were led by
ministers: out of those, only two took place in July; one of
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them was led by PM Sanna Marin on the EU package. We left
this out of the study as the pandemic was not much debated at
that time, but it started again in August and with vaccinations
starting after Christmas. The third period saw increased
criticism of the government and responses that seemingly
satisfied the hashtag publics.
First Period: The Emergence of COVID-19
as an Issue in Finland and the Government’s
Response
The first period covers the turning of COVID-19 from an
international into a Finnish topic. The first dataset spans from
FIGURE 1 | The first period’s overview of the topics: the average relative probability of tweets per day in the 6-day model. Note, there were only one to two tweets
per day before 20 January 2020.
FIGURE 2 | The 20-topic set and press conferences in the first period.
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11 January to 22 March 2020, thus covering the beginning of
COVID-19 in Finland. COVID-19 became highly debated
through the hashtags we followed for this period, particularly
with and after the declaration of the pandemic. The buzz on
Finnish Twitter started at the declaration of the pandemic on 11
March (see Annex 13 for tweets per day in the first period).
Of the six macro topics (see Annex 2 for topics and Annex 5
for individual figures, and Figure 2), topic on the government,
the PM, and on people following government instructions (T1)
includes both criticism towards the government and the
selected corona strategy, and tweets supporting the
government and its corona strategy. Topic two gathers
sentence structures, but the tweets and discussions related
to T2 share their experiences and feelings related to the
pandemic. Topic on schools, travels, and quarantine (T3)
also includes cancellations of travel arrangements and
restrictions to public amenities. Topic on working and
entrepreneurship as well as guidelines, public
communication, and information (T4) unveil information
related to COVID-19 to entrepreneurs, entrepreneur
interest group requests of support towards government, and
press releases of employer and employee unions about the
pandemic and work. Topic on the politics of the COVID-19
crisis, sustainability, government, and state of the exception
(T5) includes tweets about general discussion related to the
crisis, politics, state of emergency, and the economy. Topic on
the situation and spread of COVID-19 in China, Italy, and
Finland (T6, see Figure 3) demonstrates the transformation of
foreign epidemy into a pandemic and domestic issue.
We observed a transformation between the strengths of the
different topics, and, as Figure 3 demonstrates, how and when the
pandemic and the Finnish state of emergency were declared;
other topics overtook the relative importance of the international
spreading of the virus (T6). To explore in more depth through
multiple topics and matching the dates of the governmental press
conferences on COVID-19, we worked on a larger list of topics
(175 for the same period, Figure 2).
We grouped these 20 topics into five groups according to the
tweets that they refer to. The first group is a general discussion
related to COVID-19, which includes mainly private persons
discussing different aspects of COVID-19 (G1); second is related
to organizations and discussions about organizational
FIGURE 3 | Topic content shift: relative share of first period topic T47.
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announcements (G2); third is related to government and official
announcements about the COVID-19 situation, and discussions
about these announcements (G3); fourth is about news about
COVID-19, and the discussion related to the news (G4); fifth is
related to both critical and supportive discussions about the
government and official response to the COVID-19 situation
(G5) (see Annex 8 for details). Topic peaks and government press
conferences are shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2 | Government press conferences and topic peaks 11 January–22 March.
27.2 12.3 16.3 17.3 18.3 19.3 20.3
G1: General discussion related to COVID-19
V19 X X X
V145 X X X
V33 X X X X
V1 X X X
V23 X X X
V136 X X X X
G2: Organizations and discussions about organizational announcements
V15 X X X X
V89 X X X
V34 X X X
V161 X X X
V88 X X X X
G3: Government and official announcements about the COVID-19 situation and discussions
V82 X X X
V47 X X X
V30 X X X X
V24 X X X
G4: News about COVID-19 and the discussion related to the news
V175 X X X X
V20 X X X
G5: Critical and supportive discussion about government and official response to the COVID-19 situation
V146 X X X
V152 X X X
V118 X X
FIGURE 4 | In the picture from 16 March, the Finnish Ministers and party leaders, apart from Minister of Interior, Maria Ohisalo (Green League). The sign language
interpreter is in the picture. (Modified video screenshot.)
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To reflect on the discursive transformation within a topic that
gathers similar types of tweets, we chose the topic on closures (G3:
T47), where the emergence of the phenomenon was discussed in
China first, then in Italy, and finally, in Finland (Figure 3). It
couples with our earlier analysis of how it was felt increasingly as
a European and potentially Finnish issue and then as a Finnish
issue. As with the six-topic model, the trend emerging on 24
February is that the international topic was overtaken by
domestic issues this week with the declaration of the pandemic.
The few tweets in the first phase in this period, 11 January to
24 February, focus on the pandemic in other countries (see
Figure 3). Notably, the recorded numbers of cases of COVID-
19 were very few in Finland. The first case was diagnosed in the
north of the country, Lapland, on 29 January. By the week
including 27 February, it reached 7 cases, and the week after
34 cases. Furthermore, people were tested only if a link to
COVID-19 was found; by 17 February, one could be tested
only with respiratory infection symptoms and a link to China
(THL 2020a). By 25 February, the list of countries to test for
COVID-19 predeparture was extended to Iran, South Korea, and
parts of Italy (THL 2020b). Tweet activity demonstrated pressure
on the government to communicate although numbers in the
native tweet hashtags we gathered were still low.
The major Twitter discussions relating to COVID-19 in
Finland began on 24 to 27 February, before the government’s
first COVID-19 press conference on 27 February (Figure 2).
None of the topics that already existed or appeared between 24
and 27 February disappeared before the end of our study period.
After 24 to 27 February, COVID-19 became something felt also in
Finland. Tweets related to all groups peaked on 27 February, the
day of the first government press conference. Of these, T146
relates to direct and often critical references towards the
government or official tweets discussing or questioning the
government and officials’ preparedness to deal with the then
upcoming pandemic.
The government press conference on COVID-19 on 27
February was defined by increased Twitter discussions. While
cases were not emerging due to the restricted testing, the
worsening of the situation globally paved the way for the 27
February conference, on the topic of the status of COVID-19 and
related preparations in Finland. Four of the five government
parties were represented, with Prime Minister Sanna Marin
(Social Democratic Party, SDP), responsible Minister Anna-
Kaisa Pekonen (Left Alliance), and Ministers Krista Kiuru
(SDP) and Katri Kulmuni (Centre). Marin stated that there
was no epidemic in Finland. Pekonen stressed the
responsibility of her ministery: they would be active and
vigilant, and Finland had good preparedness. She argued that
the masks in the country’s stockpiles, discovered to be beyond
their expiry date, could be used.
From 11 March to 16 March, extremely high activity was
recorded in Twitter related to COVID-19. The landslide in
Twitter commentary happened with the declaration of the
pandemic on 11 March, with cases of COVID-19 going from
61 that day to beyond 100 the next. All discussions in all groups
peaked on the pandemic declaration and press conference day of
12 March (see Table 2). The government decided on the
pandemic measures proposed to the parliament to decide on.
All three G5 topics peaked on 12March: in T146 and T152, tweets
criticized the government for not enacting strict COVID-19
restrictions, a lack of leadership from the government, and the
government not taking the COVID-19 situation seriously
enough. The more radical tweets claimed that the seemingly
inactive government would “have blood in their hands.” The THL
was also criticized for being incompetent and for giving the
government false advice to act upon. In T118, tweets also
praised the President of Finland Sauli Niinistö’s (National
Coalition) speech on the same day. On Thursday, 12 March,
the second government press conference about the COVID-19
situation was held to outline recommendations to limit the spread
of COVID-19 in Finland, including recommendations to limit
attendance of public events, additional budgetary means,
recommendations to workplaces, and preparations in social
and healthcare. The government parties had met on the
matter and invited all parliamentary parties to discuss options,
which included school closures. The PM opened the discussion,
and Pekonen took responsibility again, with Kiuru’s and
Kulmuni’s support. With or without the press conference, the
declaration of the pandemic was a tone changer: it would be
affecting ever more people.
The Twitter discussions seemed to retreat on most topics after
their zenith for the weekend 13 to 15 March (Figure 2) but
peaked again on 16 March, when the government announced in a
press conference to state in cooperation with the President that
the country was in a state of emergency. The momentous press
conference urged citizens that “every Finn can make a difference”
maintaining distances and staying at home and declared
preparedness to adapt crisis legislation. Several measures were
to be taken, and those over 70 were declared as a vulnerable
group. Interestingly, it was phrased that other age groups could
take on this virus, but there was a need to protect elderly people.
The emergency measures included distance work, travel
restrictions, and closure of museums and theatres. Teaching
would be moved online, but schools and day-care facilities
would serve onsite children on the lower grades of key
workers and those not in distance work. The female-led
government was present, apart from the Greens, including
Minister of Justice and party leader Anna-Maja Hendriksson
(Swedish People’s Party) and the Minister of Education and party
leader Li Andersson (Left Alliance) (see Figure 4). They
emphasized that the recommendation to distance work did
not imply an end to transportable work or teaching. Finland,
as a hi-tech country, had good telecommunications across the
country: many schools provided tools for distance learning, and
workplaces already had portable phones and laptops.
Unsurprisingly, several topic discussions peaked on 16 March
(see Table 2). In the critical and supportive discussions about the
government and official response to the COVID-19 situation
(G5), the tweets related to the topic T146 are quite critical of the
government in the early part of the day. The government was
criticized for being too inactive and not showing leadership and
was said to be incompetent. The tone of tweets in T146 changed
after the press conference. Most of them supported the
government’s decisive action and the leadership shown by the
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government, PM Marin, and the President. Similar reactions
appeared in T152 and T118. Some tweeters criticized the
government’s perceived herd immunity strategy. Comments
could be dismissive of the government, echoing misogynist
rhetoric, and supportive of President’s leadership.
The last phase of the first period spanning from 17 March to
22 March was defined by slightly receding Twitter discussions.
The government was holding daily press conferences to introduce
measures on COVID-19 control and to remind the population of
their civic responsibility. On 17 March, six ministers from all
parties but the Centre addressed in the press conference border
control, 14-day quarantines, and limiting meetings to 10 people.
The PM was joined by the Green party leader, Minister of the
Interior Maria Ohisalo; Minister of Foreign Affairs Pekka
Haavisto (Greens); Minister of Transport Timo Harakka
(SDP); and Ministers Hendriksson and Pekonen. Co-occurring
with the 17 March press conference, there were some
organizational and governmental announcement peaks
(Table 2). After peaking on 16 March, the critical and
supportive discussions (G5) declined, but the critique towards
the government and THL persisted. In the “hashtag landscape,”
the government received criticism for being indecisive and
lacking leadership and the THL for being incompetent. Some
tweets praised the President for clear leadership in a situation
where government appeared chaotic. Few tweeters voiced doubts
over the need for a state of emergency and its violation of
individuals’ rights.
On 18 March, the PM was joined by Minister Andersson and
Minister of Culture, Science and Sports Hanna Kosonen (Centre).
The day-care facilities would remain open, but it was
recommended that children of those who could stay at home
would remain at home. Children under 10 yr of age of critical
workers would be able to stay in school. On the same day, general
discussion of some G1-3 topics peaked. On 19 March,
practicalities of the pandemic, details of the virus, hygienic
practices, and details of reaching help and healthcare capacity
were discussed in the conference, under the leadership of the PM,
and Ministers Kulmuni and Pekonen. Notably, the Director of
Infectious Diseases, Professor Mika Salminen of THL, joined the
event for an epidemiological overview, which then became a
regular feature of the press conferences. On the same day, other
topics (G1-4), but not the critical and supportive topics, peaked.
The first of four all-government parties’ press conferences
ended the week on 20 March and delivered a unified message to
citizens, following a narrative structure where each minister’s
delivery followed from the previous minister’s last point,
presenting a unified message. The press conference dealt with
the economy and the amending budget, with provisions for
diverse groups. Leaders of each of the government parties
divided the task of explaining the measures, often focusing on
issues related to their core voters. In addition to the PM, present
were Kulmuni, Hendriksson, Andersson, and Ohisalo (Figure 5).
Mika Lintilä, the Minister of Economic Affairs, presented the
substance. We chose two screenshots to present the event, where
G1-2 and G4 topics peaked.
From 27 February to 20 March, period one, the conferences
were all-female panels, and the PM started each of the press
conferences followed by responsible ministers. Figure 5 shows
what a female-led government looked like on 20 March and how
Lintilä, as Minister responsible, presented on his own. Compared
with the first photos on 16 March, when the phenomenon was
hitting Finland and responsible ministers crammed into the view
FIGURE 5 | Juxtaposition: After party leaders, Maria Ohisalo (Green League), Katri Kulmuni (Centre), Sanna Marin (SDP), Li Andersson (Left Alliance), and Anna-
Maja Hendriksson (Swedish People’s Party) stressed the case, Minister Mika Lintilä (Centre) went to substance. The sign language interpreters are in the picture (modified
video screenshot).
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(Figure 5), by the formal address on 20 March, safety distances
were in use. The topic was indeed survival of the industry and the
additional budgets, demonstrating being in control of the
livelihoods of the citizens in several categories. The next
period would witness firmer actions, with the government
taking measures to control the epidemiological situation.
Second Period: United Through the First
Wave
The second period saw some momentous government decisions
on restrictions and then the lifting of restrictions, heavily tweeted
about. The second dataset spans from 21 March to 26 May 2020.
The government claimed political responsibility for the pandemic
measures, and authority over the President’s advice, but
increasingly, it gave space to experts and the administration.
As Figure 1 shows, the discussion was thriving on Twitter in the
beginning and quieting down by the end of our second period
although there were some relevant press conferences on masks
after 26 May. In the six-topic model, news and discussions related
to the COVID-19 situation (T1, focused on the situation in
Finland, including the number of infected people and deaths,
but also mentioning other countries) seemed to prevail its
relevance. Government’s COVID-19 strategy and its
implications for politics and the economy (T2, included tweets
either critical towards or supportive of the government) peaked in
key moments. General discussions about COVID-19 (T3,
referred to discussions about the COVID-19 situation and
how to deal with it, but also religious content and beliefs)
were the least visible. General discussions about the COVID-
19 situation and how it affected the everyday lives of people (T4,
on stress, quarantines, and comments on other people’s behavior)
were particularly high in the beginning. Information and support
on COVID-19 offered to entrepreneurs and small-to-medium
companies, or support reception, hardships, and challenges to
companies (T5) were particularly relevant during and right after
the Uusimaa closure. Discussion on schools and children,
including general discussion about the COVID-19 situation
and dealt with the opening of schools, May Day celebrations,
and spring (T6) peaked on when school openings were
announced. Six-topic model of the second period is shown in
Figure 6 (see Annex 3 for topics and Annex 6 for individual
figures).
Figure 7 (also see Annex 13) is based on our detailed topic
modelling analysis with 200 topics in this period, where we show
the distribution of the 20 most prominent topics per day and
government press conferences. Peaks co-occur with press
conferences and drop in weekends.
We divided the topics into five loose groups according to the
themes of the topics, which are listed matching topic peaks with
press conferences (see Table 3). The topic T26/G6 is considered
here a technical topic and not included in our analysis (see Annex
9 for details). As seen in Figure 7, the general trend is that the
discussions related to COVID-19 decreased during the second
period. In late March, the most prominent topics had over 300
tweets per day, but during April, only one topic amounted to
more than 200 tweets per day, except for 29 April. After 4 May,
when the government declared it was re-opening society, the
FIGURE 6 | Second period six topic model topic tweets and government press conferences.
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FIGURE 7 | The 20 most prominent topics and press conferences in the second period.
FIGURE 8 | The five-party all-female leaders’ government on 8 April: Ministers and party leaders Andersson (Left Alliance), Kulmuni (Centre), Marin (SDP), Ohisalo
(Green League), and Hendriksson (Swedish People’s Party) struggle to fit the same main picture, and now the sign language interpreter is in a separate picture (modified
video screenshot).
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discussion frequency decreased. Considering the co-occurrence
of the press conferences, and particularly G2 and G3 topics, we
would argue that the press conferences were a significant part of
the discussions of the pandemic in Finland in the hashtag
landscapes.
At the beginning of this period, the government held press
conferences daily. On 25 March, the PM and ministers from
all-government parties—apart from the Left Alliance, whose
leader had already been on stage on 23 March—announced
118 measures that would be taken to the parliament for
decision-making. They grounded these on the capacity of
health services: at that stage, every third person who had to
be hospitalized would also be taken to intensive care. The
measures included closure of the Uusimaa region, including
the Helsinki metropolitan area, where it was hoped that the
coronavirus could be contained. On 25 March, PM Marin and
several ministers announced measures that would be taken to
the parliament, as the government worried that the virus
would spread to the rest of the country from the Uusimaa
region. The announcement to restrict travel to and from the
Uusimaa region co-occurred with a major spike in topic T109
related to the Uusimaa closure. The tweets of topic T109 on 25
March were mostly from private persons discussing distinct
aspects of the planned Uusimaa closure. T109 peaked next on
28 March, which was the day when the closure was enforced.
Both the announcement of the planned closure on 25 March
and the enforcement of the closure on 28 March witnessed
major related discussions in T109, more prominently after the
announcement than after the actual closure. On 25 March,
both G5 topics T52 and T99 peaked, with criticism on the role
and actions of THL. Many tweets criticized THL for being too
lenient about the pandemic, and stricter control mechanisms
were needed. This criticism extended from THL to the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (STM), Minister
Pekonen, and the government. The government was also
criticized for mishandling testing and for not securing
incoming passengers’ safe entry through the Helsinki
airport. Later, this same topic included tweets on facemasks.
FIGURE 9 | Juxtaposition: The government’s COVID-19 conference for children on 24 April included Minister Kosonen, PM Marin, and Minister Andersson. On 20
May, the conference was set for over-70-yr-old citizens. Päivi Topo, Ikäinstituutti (Age Institute), Sari Aalto-Matturi, Mieli ry; Panu Könönen, Suomen Latu (the Outdoor
Association of Finland), and Pirjo Nuotio as moderator. Minister Kiuru was also present on the left outside the panel pictures, usually present as a separate speaker. The
sign-language interpreter is in a separate picture (modified video screenshot).
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TABLE 3 | Government press conferences and topic peaks 21 March–26 May 2020.
23.3 24.3 25.3 26.3 27.3 30.3 1.4 2.4 3.4 7.4 8.4 15.4 16.4 17.4 22.4 24.4 29.4 4.5 6.5 8.5 12.5 14.5 15.5 19.5 20.5
G1: General discussion related to COVID-19
T155 X X X X X X X
T179 X X X X X
V91 X X X X X X X
V121 X X X X X X X
V107 X X X
G2: Organizations and discussions about organizational announcements
T61 X X X X X X X X X X
V191 X X X X X X X X
V185 X X X X X X X X
V194 X X X X X X X
G3: Government and official announcements about the COVID-19 situation and discussions
V18 X X X X X X X X X X X X
V8 X X X X
V109 X X
G4: News about COVID-19 and the discussion related to the news
V161 X X
V66 X X X X X X
V106 X X X X X X X X
V70 X X X X X X X X
G5: Critical and supportive discussion about government and official response to the COVID-19 situation
V99 X X X X X X X X X X
V52 X X X X
G6: Non-substantial topic about time in COVID-19 tweets




































In March, many of the topics peaked, coinciding with press
conferences (Figure 7 and Table 3). We specify the peaks of
different topics that coincide with conferences: 24 and 25 March
were peak days of the week between 23 and 27 March, when daily
press conferences were organized to prepare for the pandemic
responses. On 30 March, when the second female-led
government press conference was held on the extension of the
measures until 13 May, 10 topics peaked. Restaurants would be
closed for everything but take out. Schools would have distance
learning from the fourth grade on and for most 1–3 grades, with a
recommendation to also keep children at home from day-care
facilities. The Uusimaa region’s closure for other than necessary
travel would last until 19 April, including over the Easter holiday
break. On 30 March, there was also a peak in G5 topics T52 and
T99 criticizing the government for insufficient testing capacity,
stating that the aim of the COVID-19 strategy should be to
suppress the epidemy and to question THL’s non-
recommendations on mask usage. The tweets referred to the
letter sent by the President on 30 March to the government,
where he suggested forming a specialist leadership group
(“koronanyrkki”/“Corona fist”) to deal with Finland’s
pandemic governance and criticized the government for
turning the President’s suggestion down.
The week of 30 March to 3 April, press conferences took place
daily again. On 8 April, Twitter lit up, when the third all-female
government press conference addressed the worry of economic
recession (see Figure 8). On several occasions, particularly at the
government press conference on 8 April, where all parties were
present, emphasis was on not repeating the mistakes of the
economic recession of the 1990s in Finland, when the fall of
the Soviet Union led to the undoing of favorable trade links with
the Eastern neighbor. The signifier economic downturn
represented a generational trauma: waves of bankruptcies and
worsening municipal economies deeply affected families and
schools when the millennial party leaders were growing up. In
2020, cheap loans were available, and the Eurozone was seen as
sustaining the Finnish economy, and the Minister of Finance
Kulmuni argued: “The municipalities are among the state’s most
important partners in helping businesses and families.” Although
Finland never entered a full lockdown in 2020, the government
acknowledged that it suffered from the closures of particularly the
service industry, and culture and arts, and sought to remedy
them. The second press conference held on 8 April included only
officials from responsible ministries and agencies (STM, NESA,
TEM, and UM) to give answers to questions about protection
equipment. This press conference co-occurred with a major spike
in tweets related to topic T173 on insufficient preparation on
protective equipment, or “maskigate” (“mask gate”).
Interestingly, T173 peaks on 9 April, a day after a press
conference responded to questions concerning the actions of
the National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA), but this, in fact,
may have strengthened the theme.
The epidemiologic situation improved, and a week later, on 15
April, the Uusimaa region’s travel restriction was lifted. The virus
had already spread beyond the Uusimaa borders, but the
measures had lessened its movement, and from a
constitutional perspective, the government could not maintain
such restrictions on citizens’ liberties. The travel restriction zone
had been controlled by the police with the help of the Finnish
armed forces in multiple shifts, and it was also quite expensive, so
lifting it would enable the police to have more resources to
address domestic violence, which had been on the increase, as
Minister Ohisalo stated on 15 April. The Uusimaa closure T109
peaked. On 16 April, the economywas discussed, and on 17 April,
the President and CSOs appeared at Marin’s press conference on
societal resilience, including representatives from CSOs such as
the Finnish Red Cross and Mieli Mental Health Association. In
the last week of April, there were a few topics peaking, with
government press conferences on 22 and 24 April. On 22 April,
Marin declared a new strategy for controlling the spread of the
virus, with enhanced management of the pandemic, and stated
that while public events would remain banned until the end of
July, the reopening of schools would be announced before the end
of the month. On 24 April, the Marin government organized a
conference for children receiving a lot of positive attention in T91
and worldwide in the press. Children asked questions about the
epidemic situation, including when they could go to school, and
the vaccination would be ready (see Figure 9).
On 29 April, PM Marin and Minister of Education Li
Andersson declared that schools would re-open on 13 May. It
was the most active day in April tweets. Both G5 topics T52 and
T99 peaked: tweets criticized the government and THL for a
perceived change in pandemic strategy, where suppressing the
epidemy was no longer the target. Critical tweets claimed that the
government’s indecisive actions implied a herd immunity
approach, which would increase casualties. Some tweets
criticized schools re-opening; others called for mandatory
mask wearing. A few days later, trade unions declared their
concern about safety regarding reopening. Figure 7 shows a
clear spike in the discussions related to this topic prior to 1
May and in mid-May.
From 4 May, the government started planning to lift
restrictions, and the last press conference with all-government
party leaders declared a new strategy of testing and tracing.
Responding to public debates, they promised a study of the
usefulness of masks. Criticism on the lack of a
recommendation regarding mask use started peaking T52
already on 4–6 May and, around school openings, on 15 May.
At the end of the period, an administration-led press conference
launched a study that said there is no evidence of mask use
protecting the user. On 15 May, they still recommended that
elderly people avoid contact, and on 20 May, the government had
a conference for over-70-year-old citizens, with a retired TV
anchor as the moderator. Tweets in our topics do not pay much
attention to the elderly, with some mentions in T185 on health
service access peaking on 6 April. The conference addressed the
generational worry of not having seen grandchildren and the
assertive nature of government recommendations (Häyry 2021).
Looser measures were followed by some other tougher lines,
after expert meetings recommended tougher lines. One such
example was whether Finns should stay in their cottages
during the crisis: on 23 March, Pekka Timonen from the
Ministry of Education and Culture (OKM) argued that Finns
were better off at their cottages. But the government soon sided
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with suggesting staying at home, and PM Marin urged even after
the lockdown on 15 April that it was “no time for going to the
cottage.” Something particular to this government was that it
sought to convey empathy and attention to special groups that
suffered from the situation, bringing citizens, CSOs, and experts on
the stage. The performance of control was no longer as tangible in
the 30 March or 8 April events, and five-party all-female
conferences were no longer apparent: potentially because social
distances were kept, and the sign language interpreter was
embedded in the video on parallel in a separate picture (see
Figure 8).
Third Period: Administrating Control and
Managing Criticism
Our third period spans from 1 August 2020 to 10 January 2021
(see Annex 13 for the number of tweets per day). Given the
discussion above on the overall declining COVID-19 hashtag
use, we also took keywords in this set (see Annex 12). Twitter
activity regarding COVID-19 fluctuated a bit, with more
activity in August, early October, and from late November,
but it dropped before Christmas. Weekly fluctuations refer to
weekends. Tweets related to all six topics seem to stay on
similar levels during most of the period, with on mask use (T5,
featuring tweets about experiences with masks,
encouragement, and instructions) peaking in mid-August
and early October. Topic on COVID-19 vaccines (T2)
overtook others from early December steadily increasing
towards the end of the period, just as knowledge of
vaccinations increased. Discussions on the COVID-19 crisis
and politics and the economy (T6, about the financial
consequences of COVID-19 for individuals, entrepreneurs,
and companies, and discussions on the Finnish economy
and increasing debt) fluctuated, with an increased share in
early September and then late October. General COVID-19
discussions grouped fear and anxiety even in religious tone and
vocabulary (T1), short responses to large chains of Twitter
discussions (T4), or COVID-19 cases and authorities (T3).
Figure 10 shows our six-topic model from this dataset (see
Annex 4 for topics and Annex 7 for individual figures).
The detailed topic modelling analysis was done with a 100-
topic model (see Annex 12 for differences between datasets). The
20 most prominent topics and the government press conferences
are shown in Figure 11. The description of the topics is in
Annex 10.
For period three, we divided the topics into four loose groups
according to the themes of the topics (see Table 4), including
peaks with press conferences. The general discussions category in
the third dataset contains more topics than in the two datasets of
topic model analysis from spring. Therefore, the general
discussions category is divided into two sub-categories:
discussions about masks, tests, vaccinations, and general
discussions (see Annex 10 for details). Topic frequency
(Figure 11) shows slightly less-pronounced monthly and
weekly fluctuations, as in Figure 10. Press conferences
included scenarios on 10 December and vaccination
FIGURE 10 | Third-period overview of the topic six-topic model.
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availability on 17 December, and on 22 December it was
promised that vaccinations would be offered to everyone. The
European Union vaccination strategy was discussed, and the first
vaccinations were given on 27 December. Twitter discussions
emerged prior to the 29 December and 5 January press
conferences (Figure 10).
August showed a slightly declining trend on overall tweets.
The first government press conference was held on 6 August,
which also showed a total of 10 topic peaks co-occurring with the
press conference. The G4 and G1 topics co-occurred with this
press conference (Table 4) on T81 about general mask usage.
Some tweets referred to the press conference and asked why the
mask recommendation was not announced already. Peaking G3
topics included some critical tweets towards the government (T57
and T29), deeming the government indecisive and not taking the
required action fast enough regarding the pandemic in Finland.
In addition, some tweets claim that the government was using the
pandemic to transform the European Union into a federal state
via the COVID-19 recovery pact.
On 12 August, the government’s perceived inaction was
persistently criticized. Some tweets commented on the
apparent intragovernmental disagreement between Ministers
Kiuru and Lintilä regarding forced quarantine measures at the
borders of Finland. On the evening of 12 August, PM Marin
attended the main TV discussion program A-Studio (YLE 2020),
leading to both praise and criticism on Twitter. The next day she
held a press conference that included a recommendation to wear
masks on public transport. Mask-related T6 and T81 peaked also
on 6 August. T81 was about officials and organizations
announcing the mask recommendation, and tweets related to
T6 were about people tweeting about their experiences wearing
masks, people reporting whether they have seen other people
wearing masks in public transport and in public spaces and
discussing mask recommendations. The tone of the tweets
related to both topics was supportive, but there were some
tweets where THL instructions were criticized. Overall, tweets
supported the government’s mask recommendations.
Travel was the topic of the next press conference, but the end
of August also demonstrated how the opposition woke up to
contest governmental control. The 26 August press conference
was an interior ministry press conference about COVID-19
security at the borders of Finland, co-occurring with eight
topic peaks. These included G3 topics T29, with critique
towards government and local authorities about insufficient
COVID-19 testing, and an absence of mandatory testing at the
borders of Finland and at Helsinki-Vantaa airport. T57 was,
however, non-related to the topic of the press conference. After
long months of consensus, the opposition woke up. On 26
August, the Finns Party leader Jussi Halla-Aho outlined the
main targets of the party for the upcoming 2021 spring
municipal elections, with one of the main themes being the
economy. In many tweets related to T29, the critique is about
how the government used the COVID-19 situation as an excuse
to mishandle the economy. In addition, on 26 August, there were
some tweets attacking the National Coalition party based on
Coalition party leader Petteri Orpo’s opinion that he was
concerned about the rise of nationalism. The political
consensus of the pandemic spring was gone, and the
opposition had room to maneuver.
Activity related to COVID-19 on Finnish Twitter seemed to
recede in early- to mid-September. Government press
conferences were held on 3, 9, and 17 September. On 3
September, the PM and Minister of Justice Anna-Maja
Hendriksson (RKP) launched the Safety Investigation
FIGURE 11 | August-January model topics and government press conferences.
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Authority’s independent investigation to measures taken during
the COVID-19 pandemic: no villains would be sought but the first
investigation phase would build the sequence of events from
January to July (SAI 2020; see Figure 12).
In September, it becomes obvious to the authorities that some
measures ought to be used: from 17 September, a regional
facemask recommendation was taken, and on 24 September,
Puumalainen (THL) stated that “I think new measures ought
to be adopted.” On 24 September, the press conference declared
that updated mask recommendations would include interior
public spaces, coinciding with a major peak in mask-related
topics T6 and T81. Tweets in T81 addressed organizations
announcing their own mask recommendations related to the
official announcement and individual Twitter users sharing and
discussing the updated recommendations. Tweets in T6 discussed
updated recommendations, tweeting their experiences with
masks, and reporting how other people were using masks.
Overall, the tone of the tweets in both topics was supportive
of mask usage, but some tweets criticized THL’s perceived change
of stance on facemasks, questioning why the institute now
recommended a mask, even though in spring no
recommendation was given. Some tweets criticized that the
recommendation was not strong enough and that a mandatory
mask requirement should be enforced. In the G3 topic T29
peaking on 22 and 25 September, tweets criticized both the
government and THL for lacking a mandatory mask
requirement and the government for being too slow to act.
From the end of September to mid-October, discussions
related to COVID-19 increased, with mask topic T6 as one of
the more pronounced discussion subjects in this period. Both
mask topics T6 and T81 significantly increased from 6 October to
9 October, with T6 peaking on 9 October and T81 on 8 October.
The government press conference on 7 October was about local
authorities and new restrictions of restaurant opening hours and
alcohol sales. Kiuru appeared to talk about regional authorities’
role and introduced some regulations on restaurant openings.
From 8 October, the presenters wore masks: Salminen (THL)
stressed how the COVID-19 infection situation was worsening in
FIGURE 12 | Juxtaposition: Mood change that also indicates how late mask wearing started in Finland. A rare appearance of the PM in Autumn 2020 press
conferences to stress the importance of opening an investigation to crisis control of the pandemic on 3 September: Veli-Pekka Nurmi, director, SAI; PM Marin, and
Minister Hendriksson. On 22 December, STM and THL host an information session on COVID-19: Marjo-Riitta Helle, Finnish Medicines Agency, Fimea; Minister Kiuru;
and ministry’s most senior public official Kirsi Varhila. The sign language interpreter is in a separate picture (Modified video screenshot).
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TABLE 4 | Government press conferences and topic peaks 1 August 2020–10 January 2021.
6.8 13.8 19.8 20.8 26.8 27.8 31.8 3.9 9.9 17.9 24.9 1.10 7.10 8.10 14.10 22.10 29.10 12.11 19.11 26.11 3.12 10.12 17.12 22.12 29.12 5.1 7.1
G1a: Discussions about masks
T6 X X X X
T81 X X X X
G1a: Discussions about tests
T7 X X X X X X X
G1a: Discussions about vaccinations
T31 X X X X
G1b: General discussions
T5 X X X
T4 X X X X X X
T85 X X X X
T15 X X X
T87 X X X X X
G2: Organizational announcements and discussion
T9 X X X X X
T53 X X X X X
T1 X X X X X X
T37 X X X X X
G3: Government and official responses and discussion
T57 X X X X X
T20 X X X X X X X
T29 X X X X
G4: News and discussion about news
T16 X X X X X X X X
T90 X X
T77 X X X X X X X X X




































Europe and in Finland. T6 tweets on 6–9 October debated masks
and their protection, usage, and user experiences. T81 tweets
questioned the government’s mask recommendations and
requested a mandatory mask-wearing policy. With the
frequency of both T6 and T81 tweets increasing already from
6 October, it seemed that the government press conferences were
not the driver for increased Twitter discussions. Especially on 8
October, T81 tweets also questioned the government and officials’
mask stance in spring 2020, with some being extremely critical
towards the government and even claiming that the government
lied about the mask situation. Critical tweets referred to April’s
mask and protective equipment supply problems. In G3 topics
T29 and T57, the government was attached for not
recommending the use of facemasks in the spring. As a
reaction to the public discussion, including accusations of
lying, Minister Kiuru’s press conference on 14 October
addressed the mask situation in spring arguing that expert
knowledge did not support mask usage and comprehensive
guidance could not be issued. T81 peaked on 12 and 15
October, and receded after 16 October, signifying an end to
the “mask gate” discussion. We argue that the press
conference on 14 October positively contributed to closing the
discussion about the mask situation in the previous spring: an
expression of control by the government reaction to the public
discussion. Overall, 6 October was one of the most active Twitter
days in the autumn period with the mask-related tweets in topics
T6, T81, and T57. The “mask gate” was one of the main points of
contestation in the autumn-period hashtag landscape against the
government.
After late October, Twitter discussions related to COVID-19
receded, but there was an increase again in Twitter discussions
from mid-November onwards. The first government press
conference of the month was held on 12 October, and the
next government press conference was held on 19 October,
with five topics peaking the same day. The mask topic T6
started to increase after 17 November, reaching its peak on 25
November. It included discussions and arguments as to how
much masks help, the experiences of people using masks, and
people reporting how much other people are using masks. G3
topic T29 peaked on 24 November: government was criticized for
not enacting strict COVID-19 restrictions and for lack of
leadership. Some accused Kiuru of making confusing
statements. Tweets blamed the government for using the
possibility of a state of emergency as a threat. PM Marin
appeared with Kiuru, for first time since early September, at
the 26 November press conference addressing the rapidly
increasing number of cases. She urged people to act more
responsibly. Topic T7 on COVID-19 tests peaked, and the
government was criticized for not showing proper leadership
and for issuing confusing communication in relation to COVID-
19 measures (T57). This suggests that the government reacted
both to increase in COVID-19 infections and to increase public
discussion about the rising infections.
During December and early January, discussions receded from
late November levels but remained active besides the Christmas
period from 23 to 27 December. T31 and T90 related to
vaccinations started to peak. Only 3 and 22 December press
conferences were held with ministers. The message from Kiuru
was stern: cases were increasing, and contacts should be reduced.
On 22 December, she promised that there would be vaccinations
“to all who want them.” Vaccinations started in Finland on 27
December. The first press conference in 2021 on 5 January
covered COVID-19 vaccinations and the vaccination strategy.
Already on 4 January, discussions related to government response
in topic T29 peaked, with doubts about the government
vaccination strategy, as the government was accused of being
too slow or even delaying vaccinations.
Overview on Pandemic Transformation
We chronologically generated and investigated data on press
conferences for who was there and what was said, leaving other
features of the press conferences outside this study. The timing of
press conferences offered chronology to the study. We periodized
our research into three segments and generated both a wider
perspective with five to six topics, and a more refined analysis
with multiple topics. Here, we studied the topic peaks and
qualitatively analyzed tweets in those moments, investigating
transformations in the “hashtag landscape” capturing the
discursive field, crisscrossed with antagonism but also public
building performing control, and contestation through Twitter.
In the first period, the Marin government performed collective
responsibility for COVID-19 measures by presenting a
unanimous voice and staging ministerial presence through
press conferences. Space was given to ministers responsible for
different policy areas, and most ministers were involved in the
pandemic situation. In the Twitter data, we can recognize
criticism towards the government and the expert body THL.
The second period saw a fragmentation of the faces of control in
press conferences from a presence of multiple ministers to experts
for epidemiological and technically defined topics such as masks.
There were also fourth sector actors and citizens. Economic
resilience, rather than restrictions, featured as the main topic
of the first all-female government’s press conference on 20
March. The PM also started the second such event on 30
March with thanks to individuals and businesses. At the next
conference, on 8 April, she argued that in the middle of a crisis, it
was important to help individuals and businesses to survive. The
tweets contested leadership, siding with the presidential
suggestion of the “covid fist,” criticizing Uusimaa closure,
finally re-opening of schools, and lax approach to facemasks.
The government communicated the graveness of the situation
via several ministers, which also unveiled cross-sector effects and
attempts to solve it in the spring and summer. This showed the
strength of the government and legitimated the use of the
emergency powers legislation in government control. In the
performative sense, the appearance of several ministers in the
press conferences, and even the info session for children on 24
April, demonstrated the government’s control of the issue. The
conferences always started with ministers’ speeches and the
political control of the situation, followed by the health
authorities’ overview of the situation and questions from the
audience of media onsite or over video or phone link—or selected
children, in the case of the children’s info session (Figure 9). At
other times, they included the senior citizens and CSOs. The
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autumn showed COVID-19 had become business as usual and
governance of the crisis normalized. Financial consequences were
discussed in August, and some of the measures of the government
were criticized publicly; particularly, the opposition parties took
this opportunity.
In the last period, the ministers did not perform pandemic
control together, with PM Marin appearing on stage three times.
The strongest presence of multiple ministers was on 3 September,
when in two distinct conferences on the same day Kiuru
presented the plan to regulate the COVID-19 situation, and
then the PM and Hendriksson presented the SAI investigation.
After 3 September, if any of the ministers attended the press
conference, it was Kiuru and the health authorities that handled
the performance of control in the ongoing COVID-19 situation.
This all suggests that if the second wave pandemic strategy of the
government were to fail, Kiuru (SDP) would be responsible.
Indeed, in normal conditions in Finland, the control is on the
regional authorities to regulate the health districts and
municipalities based on the advice and recommendations of
the health authorities, THL and STM. This model was
explicated on 28 August in the health authorities’ press
conference and by Kiuru on 7 October and 26 November.
After delegation, however, regaining hold of the performance
of control is difficult.
DISCUSSION
Our aim was to test and launch a novel way to study social
media and politics through mixed methods and mixed data.
We developed an interpretive topic instrumentalist and
rhetoric-performative approach to the hashtag landscape,
captured in a snapshot with keywords and ever-developing
hashtags, using diverse data in tandem. We used topic
modelling as the first reading of the large dataset and as a
tool to analyze deeper discursive shifts. Instead of looking for
strict causality, we investigated patterns and co-occurrence
(Glynos and Howarth 2007), and instead of treating the
probability of topics and terms as absolute measures of
reality, we used it to better understand and interpret
discursive shifts and antagonisms. This machine-learning
approach suited our non-essentialist data-driven approach,
where rich data would also offer different emphasis and
readings. We wanted to make transparent how to read
Twitter data discursively, longitudinally, and as a discursive
field rather than a set of predefined actors.
By matching the topics with periodization marked by the press
conferences as tuned into temporal pointers, any country or crisis
case could be studied, offering tools of non-essentialist, post-
structuralist approaches to comparative politics, political
communication, and governance even comparatively. Looking
closer at topic timelines and the actual tweets in different
moments, we could see shifts in the contents of the topics as
new meanings emerged in the vocabulary that the LDA topic
modelling provided. With the attention that relationality in
discourse analysis stresses, we were able to interpret discursive
shifts and emphasis in the hashtag landscape. Contextualizing
through an alternative dataset, here the press conferences, was
useful for interpretation. In turn, the juxtaposition with the
hashtag landscape offered a new perspective to the official
communication.
In the Finnish case, existing literature’s comments of
complying citizens’ minuscule resistance at the face of re-
territorialization (Moisio 2020), and argument on the style of
COVID-19 communication as a moral coercion of the public
opinion (Häyry 2021 43-44), would in the light of our data apply
to some degree. The case of COVID-19 and the discussion on
ethics of both policies and communication continue and fall
beyond the scope of this article. We could, however, observe
points of contestation. A crisis imaginary with economic decay
was a powerful nodal point in press conferences in the spring and
the hashtag landscape also in the autumn. Issue of mask use
dominated our data in the hashtag landscape. Adopting different
policies, multi-level governance, and the precise question
emerging in the tweets of whether the government had been
lying in the spring about masks point to the pertinence of ethical
debates in pandemic politics.
Our approach to “hashtag landscape” captures discursive
shifts, transformations, nodal points, and imaginaries within
the discursive field. Regarding discussions related to masks, in
spring, discussions masks were related to specific events like
emergency supply problems or the opening of schools, or general
critique towards the government. In autumn, the mask discussion
was a topic of its own on Twitter, as people tweeted about their
everyday experiences wearing masks and reported whether other
people were wearing masks. Still, masks remained a controversial
topic during the autumn, when tweets criticized and blamed the
government for lying about the mask recommendations.
Regarding the critique, a consistent theme was the perceived
lack of action by the government. In both spring and autumn, the
government was criticized for not taking decisive action on the
COVID-19 situation. In addition, critics claimed the government
was not showing leadership. The government’s lack of leadership
was expressed as “hiding behind the health authorities” (or
scientific knowledge) and was contrasted with the leadership
shown by President Niinistö. Another consistent point of
critique was towards THL and Salmela, on incompetence. The
emergency supply mask crisis, or “mask gate,” was one of the
more salient issues that the government was criticized for in
spring and briefly in the autumn period. The government got
criticism for the (lacking) COVID-19 checks at Helsinki-Vantaa
airport in the spring and the European Union recovery package in
the autumn.
Discussing governance, a central shift in the communication,
was from an affective all-government performance to the
institutionalization of pandemic governance into an
administrative matter dealt with by mask-wearing bureaucrats
and on occasion the minister responsible, Kiuru. This changed
the mood of who was performing control and how, as well as what
control is about. The government’s current struggles in spring
2021 to convince people to reduce contacts, wear masks, and
contain virus variants derives from the transformation within the
performative process of control. The paradox of controlling the
uncontrollable or appearing in control of the fully uncontrollable
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also unveils the uneven, heterogeneous, and antagonistic
discursive field captured through our methodological approach.
Our analysis of themes and criticism shows that at least some
government press conferences ended even satisfied discussions
on contested themes. In the autumn, the government left the floor
of COVID-19 control to the experts and administration. The
absence of the full government in the autumn press conferences
meant that a collective responsibility for COVID-19 measures
was not similarly performed and control claimed. The
appearances of Kiuru and on occasion PM Marin provided a
weak, temporary symbol of control compared to the spring 2020,
when the all-female government made a powerful performative
claim on controlling the pandemic. In the hashtag landscape’s
critical voices that on occasion included misogynistic attitudes
and science-skepticism, the Marin government’s youthful,
multivocal presence in its female-led press conferences was
contrasted with one strong (male) President’s aura of control
in crisis, indicating that the presidentialist undercurrent in the
Finnish population (Paloheimo et al., 2016) still exists.
In spring 2020, the performance of control was palpable as the
faces of the crisis and key nodal points in the hashtag landscape
became ministers and the national authority. The emergency
powers legislation shifted control to the government from
regional authorities and municipalities in spring 2020, and by
autumn, those powers were returned to the regional and local
bodies. This meant that control was also decentralized, and the
second wave took speed while contestation emerged on both the
economy and the masks, until vaccinations became the dominant
issue around Christmas. The unveiled administrative-discursive
shift and performative absence of the government in the autumn
could partly explain developments in spring and summer 2021.
The performance of control and contestation between distinct
levels of governance, persistent with the extension of the
pandemic, would merit further investigation.
A detailed analysis of 2021 was out of scope of this dense
study, yet we could have used the same method of matching
government press conferences with the hashtag landscape.
Potentially, similar developments as in 2020 could have
been uncovered. The absence of the central performative
control by the Marin government was however notable:
issues were delegated to Kiuru, and the regions and the
delegated performative control would be difficult to regain
without a stress on a crisis, which in turn could have backfired
the government’s own policy. The discussion on COVID-19
persists in new virus variants and issues of vaccinations. In the
theme of vaccination, the Astra Zeneca skepticism would have
emerged in spring 2020. By August 2021, the delta-variant
wave hit Finland, whose vaccination coverage was 66 percent
for first dose and 35 percent for second dose (THL 2021). The
nodal points of the discursive field we found, from reluctance
to mask wearing, economic insecurity, Marin and Kiuru’s
policy (too strict for some, too loose for others), travel
restrictions, school closures, to vaccinations, would re-
emerge in the hashtag landscape. New themes and
explanans could also emerge crunching the big data piñata
of 2021. Furthermore, it would be useful to engage with the
questions of which kinds of discursive developments and
entanglements appear in the hashtag landscape. Further
research could include zooming to the account level within
the same machine-read data.
With this article, we highlight the importance of the study
of social media in political analysis. It is a pertinent part of
investigating discursive and hegemonic confrontations on the
wider, contingent discursive field. To hold governmental
power at the face of a pandemic or crisis requires
constitutive performance. In social media, captured through
the hashtag landscape, this performance is contested and
ratified by emerging hashtag publics. Through our novel
research method of interpretive topic modelling and
discourse theory, exploring a social media and government
interaction, we hope to have demonstrated both the contingent
nature of control and articulations of power at the crux of
contemporary politics.
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